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Whether or not privatization facilitates rural development depends upon what rural
development means. In practice, rural development often is the result of a struggle between rent
defenders and rent seekers. A positivist concept of rural development is proposed, and the
institutions of public choice are examined to determine how they might influence privatization
decisions. The conclusion is that whether or not privatization improves efficiencyof adjustmentin
rural economies depends upon the specifics of political deals required to achieve a particular act
of privatization.
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Introduction
Privatization is a term applied to a political
process whereby local and even state governments
across the United States spin off certain services to
private sector operatives. This term is also applied
to the process by which the Thatcher government in
the United Kingdom devolved to private investors
certain industries previously nationalized by Labor
governments, and it is the popular term applied to
the process of transforming Russia and its former
satellite nations into market economies (Vickers and
Yarrow 1988; 1991). Ostensibly this paper is about
privatization and rural development. But what
privatization implies with regard to rural
development depends in large part upon what we
understand rural development to mean, and rural
development means different things to different
people. There is no way to evaluate the implications
of privatization for rural development without first
coming to terms with the meaning of rural
development itself. In attempting to do so,
privatization, which is a topic worthy of
considerable discussion on its own, receives
somewhat secondary treatment.
Summarized briefly, the argument advanced
in this paper is as follows: rural development can
be thought of positivistically, as well as
normatively. Positivistically, rural development is an
observable, potentially predictable process of
adjustment on the part of rural economies to
Schumpeterian change in a market system. It is in
the material interest of society that this process of
adjustment be efficient, lest the society as a whole
be poorer than it need be. Whether privatization is
or is not conducive to efficient adjustments in rural
economies depends upon the political deals that
must be cut to achieve specific acts of privatization.
Hence, if rural development is understood by
economists in terms of improvements in general
economic efficiency, there is no clear, unambiguous
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basis for favoring privatization as a general
prescription for rural communities. Each case of
privatization must be examined within the political
context in which it arises; and as the subtitle of the
paper asserts, substance depends upon process.
In making this argument, it is necessary to
weave together several ideas, each of which is
sufficiently complicated and subtle to merit a paper
on its own. Of necessity, many points are
insufficiently developed. There are three major
sections: (1) formulation of some definitions,
focusing mainly upon developing a conceptual
understanding of privatization and a positive,
generic theory of rural development as a
market-driven process of adjustment to
Schumpeterian change; (2) an examination of
institutions, particularly political institutions, as
factors in rural development wherein public choice
theory is used to analyze the conditions under which
privatization is likely to occufi and (3) a
reconciliation of some of the apparent and obvious
conflicts in the preceding analysis and an attempt at
a general assessment of what can be said, a priori,
about the relationship between privatization and
rural development.
Basic Definitions and Concepts
What is Privatization?
While privatization is often seen in the
economics literature as a broad process of reducing
the role of government in the day-to-day operations
of an economic system (Broadman and Vining;
Lipon and Sachs; Sappington and Stiglitz; Shaprio
and Willig; World Bank; Vickers and Yarrow 1988
and 1991), the privatization with which we are
concerned here is much more mundane, In the
United States, privatization is primarily something
that takes place at the local or state level, It is
associated in the popular mind with contracting with
private firms for the delivery of certain services
previously delivered by government employees,
especialIy services such as garbage collection and
disposal, ambulance services, or even operation of
prisons (Fisk, Kiesling, and Muller).
Yet contracting is only one of many ways
that governments can arrange for services to be
delivered to citizens by private operatives. Vouchers
to parents for use in paying for the education of
their children is no less a way than contracts to
devolve responsibility for delivery of services to
private enterprises. Indeed, upon examination, it
becomes clear that operational privatization can
occur also as a result of the assignments of
franchises, sale of assets, deregulation, volunteerism,
private donations, or service shedding (State
Reorganization Commission:3-4). All of these are
instruments for accomplishing what is, in a
positivist sense, the same thing: the transfer of
operational responsibility for certain social functions
from the public to the private sector.
The adjective operational, as used in the
last sentence of the previous paragraph, is of
sufficient importance that it requires particular
attention. What is at question in privatization issues
is not whether a good or service will be supplied
but whether the good or service is provided by
government employees, a nonprofit organization, or
a profit-seeking firm and whether the good or
service is paid from revenues collected by
government or by fees, charges, or contributions
collected by a nongovernmental entity. Privatization
is not about how public policy is made but how
public policy is carried out,
Can privatization, so understood, be used
effectively as a development strategy for rural
communities? That depends upon what rural
residents understand development to mean and what
they expect rural development to do for them,
Considered from the perspective of economics, it
also depends upon whether economists understand
rural development as a normative or positive
concept, The answer to the question need not be the
same if rural development is understood
normatively, in terms of a set of goals of rural
residents, or if it is understood positively, as a
process of adjustment to market forces that
improves upon global efficiency.
Let me explore the second, more complex
understanding first, i,e., the understanding of rural
development as a phenomenon of positive
economics, That requires that I first sketch out a
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Rural Development and Rural Economies
The adjective rural has no meaning apart
from the adjective urban. It is a geographic term
referring to all those places that are not, by some
measure, urban. Conversely, urban refers to all
those places that are not rural. To know what one
term means, I must first define the other.
There was a time, not much more than a
generation ago, when quibbling over what was rural
or urban was of little practical usefulness, Urban
places were cities or towns and their built-up
environs. Boundaries, even if not so distinct as to be
self-evident on the ground, were easily locatable,
plus or minus a few miles. Beyond those
boundaries, everything else was rural.
But the automobile and interstate highways
changed all that. New forms of polycentric cities
have come into being that enclose within them
significant cells of relatively open country.
Residential subdivisions and suburban shopping
centers are intermixed with agricultural activities in
some parts of the country. What has emerged is the
galactic city, a spatially dispersed structure of urban
masses held together by a type of mutual
socioeconomic gravitation and within which there
may be considerably more open space that built-up
area (Lewis; Garreau).
What is rural, therefore, is no longer very
clear, and this lack of a paradigm of rurality is a
major problem hampering our understanding of rural
development from a positivist perspective.
Kenneth Deavers has offered a useful
starting place for redefining rural. Deavers defines
it in terms of observed characteristics of undeniably
rural places: they are places with (1) specialized
economies, (2) low-density human settlements, and
(3) remoteness from large urban centers. But of
these characteristics, remoteness is the only one that
has a geographic (i.e., a spatial) parameter, and the
very concept of rural is one of geography.
Hence, being rural is being (in some sense)
remote. Upon closer examination, it will become
evident that remote places, by their very nature, are
apt to have specialized economies and low-density
human settlements, But I will pass over that
examination here except to suggest that if one
conceives of rural as being, in some degree, remote
on a Thunen plain and analyzes the logical
consequences thereof, the ordering of what is cause
and what is effect in the characteristics observed by
Deaver will become rather clear (Hite and Ward).
Being remote is an economic disadvantage.
Some rural, albeit remote, places are able to offset
this disadvantage because of local resource
endowments. But if rural economies are understood
generically as remote economies, they suffer under
the disadvantage of having to overcome distance
both to move products to market and to move
purchased inputs and consumer goods into the local
economy, The costs of overcoming distance are
perhaps less today than once was the case, but they
are still greater than zero; and so long as they
remain positive, the disadvantages will persist.
Remoteness and Rural Development
Remoteness is not a simple concept. In a
developed society, there is no single city, as in the
abstract world of Thunen. Rather there is a
hierarchical system of cities along the lines
described by Christaller, and that system is distorted
by features of the physical terrain, local resource
endowments, human history, and human politics.
Recent work by Krugman (Krugman; Fujita and
Krugman) shows that there are many possible urban
hierarchies, each corresponding to one of many
possible spatial equilibria. Although any of these
equilibria can accommodate some jockeying for
market advantage by economic actors without giving
way, Krugman’s work suggests that these equilibria
are apt to be quite unstable. Exogenous shocks
resulting from new Schumpeterian innovations can
dislodge the spatial structure—significantly and
dramatically in the early stages of a big new
developmental economic wave—transforming urban
hierarchies. And each transformation changes the
degree of remoteness of a particular rural place.
The result is that the economic spatial
environment wherein rural places exist in a
capitalist system is in a constant state of flux,
necessitating continual adjustments. Yet adjustments
to obtain the efficiencies offered by an existing
equilibrium is not economic development, at least
not economic development of the Schumpeterian92 Hite: Rarul Development, Privatization and Public Choice
theory. Rural development, to the extent it has any
positive economic dimension, might be defined as
a process of adjustment occasioned by the
destruction of an old equilibrium and the need to
search for a new equilibrium, a process driven by
utility-maximizing individuals, operating or
controlling resources within a more or less remote
economic environment.
In general terms, economists understand
quite well the nature of some of these adjustments.
At the firm level, enterprise and input mixes are
adjusted in accordance with the principles of
marginal analysis. Households respond in
accordance with the same principles to adjust
consumption and participation in labor markets.
These household adjustments may, in fact, involve
decisions to relocate to other places, to migrate,
Less well understood are the adjustment
processes involving community institutions,
including (but not limited to) governments. Yet it is
an undeniable fact that institutions adapt to their
environments, even if slowly, and that such adaption
is as essential to realizing the potentials for material
wealth as the adjustments made by firms and
households. All the adjustments tend to change the
environment for other firms, households, and
institutions; and so there are repeated iterations of
adjustments, gradual]y moving toward the new
equilibrium that will, itself, be overturned by some
future Schumpeterian innovation,
On the basis of what has been described to
this point, it is an open question whether the
adjustments of firms and households occur most
smoothly and expeditiously if government plays a
minimal role in the development process. But there
are factors inherent in all economies that inhibit
adjustments—limited knowledge and bounded
rationality, such as described by Simon, and asset
fixities such as are well known to production
economists (Johnson, Johnson and Quince).
There are reasons to believe that some of
these inhibiting factors, especially asset fixity
problems, are not independent of location and that
they become increasingly bothersome as one moves
from less remote to more remote locations (Hite and
Ward). Economic actors in remote locations caught
in asset fixity traps have incentives to resist changes
that reduce the value of their assets and thus to seek
to frustrate the development understood in
Schumpeterian terms. If they have influence and can
use government to serve their ends and thwart
development, it is predictable that they will do so.
While in principle, government can facilitate
development, in practice it is just as apt (and
perhaps more so) to frustrate it.
Governments, Public Choice and Privatization
Public Choice Theory Reviewed
Since governments are important
institutions, and institutional adjustments (or at least
flexibility) are no less essential in response to
changing markets than the adjustments of firms and
households, it is simply not possible to consider
rural development without considering the role of
government. Fortunately, the work of Buchanan and
the public choice theorists gives us some tools for
examining how this set of very important
institutions can be expected to respond to
adjustment imperatives.
Buchanan dates his Damascus Road
enlightenment regarding the economic nature of
public choice to the discovery of a work by
Wicksell chiding economists who in their policy
advice assume that governments are benevolent
despots (Buchanan 1992:6). Public choice theory
rests on the same fundamental assumptions about
human behavior as the neoclassical theory of price
and the firm: individuals are guided by their
self-interest, rationally weighing the benefits and
costs at the margin of various courses of action. If
the policies and programs of government serve the
public interest (however that may be defined), it is
not so much because that was the intent of the
various actors making choices, but rather a
consequence of the rules that constrain choices
(Buchanan, 1986),
Because participation in the political arena
is not costless, participation is limited to those who
expect that the benefits (whether in the form of
prestige, self-esteem, material wealth, or any other
variable entering individual utility functions) to be
derived from participation are greater than the costs
of participation, This benefit-cost ratio being
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circumstances, some elements of a society, even in
a broadly based popular democracy, will have
greater incentives to participate and to seek to
influence political outcomes than others. The
relatively high cost of organizing to influence
political outcomes (particular]y when the numbers
of beneficiaries are large and the benefits diffused)
will result in a disproportionate influence on
political outcomes being exerted by special interests
(Olson).
Among the special interests with sufficient
means and incentives to organize to influence
political outcomes are asset holders who wish to
protect their rents by defending the status quo. Let
me call these special interests the rent-defenders
(Amacher and Ulbrich:849; Wenders).
Opposing them are the rent-seekers, special
interests that have speculated in a new generation of
assets and seek change of the particular sort that
favors profitable use of these new assets (Note:
there are those who object to the term
rent-seekers—see Samuels and Mercuro in
Collander, 55-70-and different authors have
assigned specific definitions to the term that are
narrower than the way it is used here). The use of
the term here is consistent with the definition
offered by Amacher and Ulbrich, i.e., rent-seeking
is “the commitment of scarce resources to capture
returns created artificially” (Amacher and
Ulbrich:G- 12).
Those who are rent-defenders in some cases
may be rent-seekers in others, and the distinction
between the two should not be over emphasized
here. Still, political struggles often are the result of
the conflicting objectives of these two types of
special interests, one favoring maintenance of the
status quo, the other seeking change.
In any conflict, the defense has certain,
although not decisive advantages, and so it is that
rent-defenders have a built-in advantage, There are
many aspects of a status quo, not all of equal
importance to particular rent-defenders. But the fact
that the different aspects of the status quo coexist
means that they are not incompatible with one
another. There is only one status quo. Hence the
rent-defenders are united in defending what exists,
a very definite thing. Rent-seekers do not all desire
the same future. There are many possible
assessments of the future upon which speculation
can occur, and not all possible futures are
compatible with one another. Hence the specific
changes that rent-seekers desire vary across a wide
range and sometimes are in conflict with one
another.
Maintaining unity within a broad coalition
of rent-seekers is not impossible, but it is more
difficult than within a coalition of rent-defenders.
And in a democratic system, unity matters. Hence,
there is an inherent bias within democratic political
institutions favoring those interest groups standing
on the defensive.
On any specific issue, either the
rent-defenders or the rent-seekers may support
policies and programs that have the effect of
fostering rural development adjustments. But if rural
economic development is understood as being
different from economic growth, as those two terms
are differentiated by Schumpeter and Flammang—if
economic development is a process of creative
destruction—it requires more than marginai
adjustments by government. It requires that
government policies reach for a future, not attempt
to preserve a past. So, in the main and with
exceptions acknowledged, the prospects for rural
development ride on the success of rent-seekers.
The presence in the political arena of an
influential coalition of rent-seekers is a necessary
condition for economic development generally and
for rural development understood in positivist terms.
Indeed, the politics of rural development are almost
solely the politics of rent-defending and
rent-seeking. Yet the existence of an influential
coalition of rent-seekers is not a sufficient condition
for rural development, at least not sufficient if rural
development connotes any gain in global efficiency.
Rent-seeking can be a zero or even a negative sum
game. Hence, while concluding that rent-seeking is
a driving force in the development process, one
cannot say that rural development depends upon
rent-seekers prevailing in every circumstance. To
understand why, we must consider rural
development from a rent-seeking perspective.94 Hi(e: Rural Development, Privatization and Public Choice
Rural Development as Rent-Seeking Behavior
An alternative way of thinking about rural
development is to view it as rent-seeking behavior.
That is, holders of rural assets seek to maximize the
value of rents arising both from market demand and
government policies, They are indifferent to the
source of the rents, whether the market or public
policies; only the net magnitude of the rents matters.
They will follow whatever course of action, either
as market or political actors, that they perceive
offers the greatest net rents.
So conceived, rural development policy
objectives are determined by the expected impact of
various political outcomes on the rents accruing to
holders of rural assets. The asset holders themselves
need not have a rural residence, nor need their asset
holdings be exclusively rural, Corporate
organizations that include certain rural-situated
assets within the totality of what can be large,
diversified portfolios might be expected to have
sufficient interest in rural development policy to
become politically active. So, too, might
environmental groups, most of whose members are
not rural residents.
Resident asset holders in rura1
places—farmers, local business and professional
persons, local public officials and public
employees+ annot assume that the political
outcomes that maximize the rents of nonresident
asset holders will also maximize their rents, Hence,
the rural development policy objectives of asset
holders who are also residents of rural places and
citizens of rural communities may not be mutually
compatible with those of others who also fly the
rural development banner in the public choice arena.
Indeed, in some cases, the policy objectives of
various types of rural residents may not be mutually
compatible either. And rent-defenders with fixed or
highly specialized assets who are hostile to
development understood in Schumpeterian terms
may also fly the rural development banner as part of
their defensive tactics,
Some of the large private sector corporate
entities may possess sufficient motivation and
means to achieve desired political outcomes without
forming alliances with other partners. Yet even
these powerful corporations can gain political
leverage by entering coalitions with other
rent-seekers who have mutual]y compatible policy
objectives, The rural resident asset holders acting
separately are relatively powerless in affecting
political outcomes, particularly now that most of the
nation’s electorate is urban or suburban. Hence, the
shape of rural development policy—indeed, the
operational political meaning of rural
development—is dictated by opportunities to form
coalitions of rent-seekers.
It is very hard to argue that such an
understanding of rural development is incompatible
with rural development politics, as observed. But it
is an understanding wherein rural development has
no fixed meaning. If rural development has no fixed
meaning, privatization may or may not be an
effective part of a rural development strategy.
Everything depends upon the opportunities for
political coalitions of those who seek rents from
rural assets.
Coalition Possibilities for Privatization
We need not leave the matter there,
however. We can ask what the necessary conditions
for coalitions between those who seek rents from
rural assets and those who seek rents by
privatization are.
It is important to understand that
privatization in most U.S. communities represents
an experiment with change. Ideologically
“conservative” economists may endorse privatization
because it harnesses the power of the profit motive
in free enterprise, But to holders of fixed or
specialized assets in places where it has no tradition,
privatization is not a conservative option. Rather it
is a radical way to deliver public goods and, as
such, disrupts the status quo, Anything that disrupts
the status quo is a potential threat to rent-defenders.
It does not necessarily follow that
rent-protectors will oppose any efforts at
privatization. One can imagine a number of
situations wherein some of the special interests that
hold the upper hand in political circles might see
ways to redeploy existing assets profitably by
contracting with government or be moved to (more
subtly) use their political influence to funnel
contracts toward favored clients. What matters is not
whether they can, in fact, use privatization to
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some bloc of usual defenders of the status quo
believe they can. If so, the champions of
privatization could be those who, strategically,
defend the status quo but for tactical reasons favor
privatization.
Not denying that possibility, I nevertheless
discount it heavily. If the defenders of the status
quo are shrewd and Machiavellian enough to see
possibilities of using privatization as a tactical ploy,
they are also likely to be shrewd enough to
understand such a ploy carries significant risks.
Given experience in successfully using the
traditional forms of government, the somewhat
unknown risks of experimenting with privatization
are sufficient to give pause to rent-defenders who
are not in the grips of hubris or desperation, That
rent-defenders might possibly favor privatization
cannot be ruled out, a priori, but it is not an option
that clear-eyed rent-defenders are likely to embrace
unless driven to do so as a last-ditch tactic.
The energy to achieve privatization is much
more likely to be supplied by interest groups that
seek policies that will create new rent-yielding
arrangements. They include hard-headed business
people who have spotted an opportunity but are
hampered in realizing its potential by existing
government policies. They also include romantic
dreamers who have dreamed of a future where they
are rich or famous or both and who are willing to
experiment with new possibilities that might make
those dreams come true, Dreaming alone, of
course, is not sufficient, but the dreamers who wake
with a fire in their bellies and seek rationally to
realize the dream will, in accordance with
Buchanan’s theory of clubs (Buchanan 1965;
Mueller: 129-34), eventually become part of a
coalition of interest groups, allying themselves with
the frustrated business people, If the coalition is
adroit in the way it attacks the status quo, it will in
time whittle away at the resistances to adjustment.
Under what conditions would one expect to
find within the coalition of rent-seeking interest
groups a particular interest group desirous of
privatization? Recalling again that political
participation is not costless, interest groups
attempting to influence policy so as to favor
privatization will be active only if the existing way
that government delivers public goods is so
inefficient that some private entrepreneurs see
substantial and enticing rents from contracting with
government for their delivery, That is, only if there
are big savings to be realized from a private sector
regime for delivering public goods, will anyone get
interested in political outcomes that facilitate
privatization,
However, situations wherein such big
savings might be possible are not hard to imagine.
Technological developments are likely to prove a
rich lode of ideas for innovations that increase
productivity in the delivery of public goods, and
traditional bureaucracies beyond the discipline of the
market will have little incentive to change and
strong incentives not to. If the institutional structure
of the society is particularly rigid after years of
accretion (to use one of Olson’s terms), government
operations are like]y to be dreadfully inefficient and
the potential savings to the taxpayers from
privatization so large as to compel some change or
reform, of which privatization is an option that can
win approval.
The current popularity of privatization as an
abstraction is a sign that the conditions required for
privatization interests to ally with other rent-seekers
operating under the banner of rural development are
emerging in the United States. Dog-eared copies of
David Osborne’s and Ted Gaebler’s book,
Reinventing Government are all over the place.
Perhaps it is no accident that an admirer of Osborne
(the admiration apparently is requited) was elected
president of the United States in 1992. It is also no
accident that the little magazine Governing has
achieved a remarkable circulation among the same
sort of trendy public administrators and politicians.
The ideas, including privatization, examined in these
publications are not exactly topics of the nightly
television news, but the problems they seek to
address are regularly topics on that nightly news.
Taxpayer resistance is forcing governments to
experiment, even if the experiences are viewed
askance by the old guard defending existing rents;
and some of these experiments show that under the
right conditions privatization can lead to greater
efficiency.96 Hite: R14rul Development, Privatization and Public Choice
Reconciliation and Assessment
Two Understandings, One Reality
I have laid out two very different
understandings of what rural development,
understood in positivist terms, might mean—the first
one rooted in Schumpeterian development theory
and neoclassical theory of asset fixity and the
second in the new public choice theory of
rent-seeking behavior.
Different as they are, however, the two
understandings of one reality are reconcilable. With
the constitutional order that exists in the United
States, rent-seeking behavior is not fundamentally
inconsistent with neoclassical theory of adjustment
nor with Schumpeter’s concept of economic
development. Indeed, if the profit motive is what
drives Schumpeterian innovation in business and
industry, the rent-seeking behavior can be
understood as the dynamic that brings about
institutional adjustments to Schumpeterian change.
Privatization is one set of possibilities for
adjustments in governmental institutions. For
political reasons, it is unlikely to be exercised until
there are rather large and certain efficiencies to be
gained from doing so, The appropnable gains to
private economic actors from privatization will have
to be sufficiently large to attract the eye of
rent-seekers and to cause them to become politically
active. Achieving privatization requires a
willingness to bear significant transactions costs on
the part of the rent-seekers because there are strong
incentives for rent-defenders to protect the status
quo, Those rent-defenders can summons all the
inherent strengths that are conferred upon those who
occupy defensive positions and are not apt to be
dislodged except by determined, persistent effort.
That means privatization will occur later
than might be optimal if the overall objective is to
maximize the economic well-being of society,
particularly rural society. But if governmental
operations are antiquated by increased capabilities
of the private sector, there is an internal dynamic
within democratic polities leading to their transferal
to the private sector, Privatization might
not—probably will not-occur as soon as might be
desirable or even to the extent that might be
desirable if everything fell in place precisely in the
manner and time of those economic models where
transactions costs are assumed away. But
rent-seeking behavior assures that if there are big
efficiency payoffs from privatization, it wilI
eventual]y occur. Institutions operating under a
constitutional order such as the United States are
likely to evolve (should I say stumble?) in the
direction of what is required to maximize (what
economists understand as) efficiency.
Assessment
We cannot say, however, that privatization
is always consistent with rural development
regardless of how rural development might be
defined. The two concepts examined here are
reconcilable, but that does not mean they are the
same, If rural development as rent-seeking behavior
is simply one of the processes of rural development
seen as adjustment in the face of asset fixity, it is
also a cycle sensitive process. Those who might at
some date see privatization as a way of augmenting
rents will not be much interested in it at other dates
when the gains from privatization are less evident.
Privatization, abstractly construed, is always
consistent with rural development conceived as an
adjustment process toward improvements in
efficiency, If privatization occurs, it is an indication
(some exceptions noted, as per rent-defenders using
privatization as a tactical ploy) that the old ways of
delivering services by governments were grossly
inefficient and some change was merited on
efficiency grounds.
Yet a specific act of privatization may or
may not be consistent with a gain in efficiency. Any
specific obsewed act of privatization (and only
specific acts have any positivist meaning) connotes
only that some rent-seekers (who need not be rural
residents) believe they can profit by a more efficient
arrangement for delivery of certain services and are
able to prevail in the political arena. And since
prevailing in the political arena usually requires
swapping votes within a coalition, there is a
possibility that the efficiency gains from
privatization will be swamped by the inefficiencies
introduced by the policies which are a necessary,
concomitant part of the political bargain. To repeat:
substance depends upon process.J. A~r. and Applied Econ., July, 1993
All this may seem rather abstract. But for
agricultural economists working in rural
development research or extension, it has two
practical, clinical implications: (1) it is not possible
to make any definitive statement about the
efficiency implications of any specific privatization
without knowing all the costs, including those
implicit in the political trades by which it came
about, and (2) while considered generically,
privatization has allure to economists, there is no
clear, unambiguous basis for favoring privatization
as a way of achieving rural development if rural
development is understood in terms of
improvements of general economic efficiency.
This second point has further important
implications for research and extension programs in
rural development. Because doing so would require
departure from the subject of this paper, I will resist
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the temptation to explore those implications here in
any depth. Suffice it to say that users of research
and extension programs will probably have little
pocketbook motivation to undertake adjustments
within the firm or household to achieve greater
economic efficiency until they explore the
possibilities of using political institutions to defend
existing or seek potential rents. If we are consistent
in our assumptions about human motivation, we
must assume that these users are not as interested in
whether privatization is good for their community or
their society (two abstractions) as they are in what
is good for them. The users of our research and
extension products are rent-defenders or
rent-seekers, and unless rural development programs
in land-grant universities satisfy their needs on
rent-defending or rent-seeking terms, there may not
be much political support for rural development
programs at budget time in the legislative arenas.
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